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FAITH HEALING EXEMPTIONS TO CHILD
PROTECTION LAWS: KEEPING THE FAITH
VERSUS MEDICAL CARE FOR CHILDREN
INTRODUCTION
Although most Americans utilize some form of medical care when they or
their children become ill, modem medical practices are not wholly accepted
throughout the United States. Various religious sects shun the use of doctors and
medicine in favor of spiritual treatment.' Unlike religious denominations which
recognize a'symbiotic relationship between religion and medicine,2 these religious
sects instruct their members to rely solely on "faith" to heal sickness and forbid
the use of medical treatment. 3 Sect members extend their "faith healing" 4 prac-
tices to the care of their children as well. Members of faith healing sects do not
provide their children with any form of medical care, a practice that often results
in tragic death.' Infectious diseases which doctors can easily treat with common
medicines become deadly when they afflict the children of parents who adhere to
faith healing beliefs.
The increase in fatalities of such children has recently attracted unprecedented
media attention and public concern.6 Much of the attention has focused on faith
1. Legal challenges to faith healing practices have involved members of the following religious groups:
the Faith Assembly (see infra notes 10-27 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the sect
and its practices); the General Assembly and Church of the First Born (see infra notes 116-33 and
accompanying text for cases involving members of the sect); the Christ Assembly (see Ohio v. Mis-
kimens, No. 83-CR-120 (C.P. Coshocton County, Ohio Jun. 15, 1984) (discussed infra notes 141-47
and accompanying text)); the Church of God of the Union Assembly (see In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d
425 (Tenn.App. 1983) (discussed infra note 127)); the Church of God and Christ (see In re Gregory S,
85 Misc.2d 846, 380 N.Y.S. 2d 620 (1976)); the First Church of Christ, Scientist (Christian Science)
(see Commonwealth v. Sheridan, No. 26307 (Super. Ct., Barnstable County, Mass. Nov. 1967) (dis-
cussed in L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW 179-83 (1969))).
2. Most religions accept modern medical practices and use prayer in addition to medical treatment to
promote healing. For discussion of the importance of religion in the healing process, see generally
Meserve, How Religion Heals, 20 J. HEALTH & MEDICINE 259 (1981); J. FIcHTER, RELIGION AND
PAIN (1981); R. YOUNG & A. MEIBURG, SPIRITUAL THERAPY (1960); G. WESTBURG, MINISTER
AND DOCTOR MEET (1961).
3. See, e.g., infra note 12 (discussing the faith healing tenets of the Faith Assembly sect). Other groups
reject the notion of human illness altogether. Christian Scientists, for example, believe that human
diseases do not exist. but are merely "misperceptions of the mortal mind." Flowers, Freedom of Reli-
gion Versus CivilAuthority in Matters of Health, 446 ANNALS 149, 159 (1979). They reject healing by
medical means and believe that "divine truth" can drive out the misperception of illness. Id. Accord-
ing to the group's founder: "Man is never sick, for Mind is not sick and matter cannot be .... [T]o
understand that sickness is not real and that Truth can destroy its seeming reality. . . is the universal
and perfect remedy." MARY BAKER EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE SCRIPTURES,
393-94 (1906).
4. For the purposes of this note, "faith healing" is defined as the use of prayer, faith, or other spiritual
means to cure illness and disease in lieu of medical treatment. "Faith healing sects" are those groups
which advocate faith healing practices. Also included are those groups which do not recognize the
existence of disease (see supra note 3). Cf Comment, Religious Beliefs and the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem: Some Problems of the Faith Healer, 8 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 396, 397 (1975); Cawley, Criminal
Liability in Faith Healing, 39 MINN. L. REV. 48, 48 (1954).
5. For examples of child fatalities which have been linked to faith healing practices, see infra notes 15-27
and accompanying text and notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Zlatos, When Faith Lets Children Die, Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Edition, Oct. 15, 1984, at 31
[hereinafter cited as When Faith Lets Children Die]; Ostling, Matters of Faith and Death, TIME, Apr.
16, 1984, at 42; Zlatos, A Child's Death: An Act of God - or Homicide?, Nat'l L. J., Sept. 17, 1984, at
6 [hereinafter cited as A Child's Death]; Swan, Christian Science, Faith Healing and the Law, FREE
INQUIRY, Spring 1984, at 4.
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healing exemptions in state child protection laws under which parents avoid pros-
ecution. More than forty states provide some form of exemption in their child
protection laws for spiritual treatment.7
In the wake of reports of medically preventable deaths of children, legislators
have received increased pressure to remove these exemptions. Nevertheless, most
states currently accommodate faith healing practices through exemptions in their
child protection laws. Moreover, church-supported lobbyists actively work to en-
sure continued religious carte blanche,' claiming that the first amendment guaran-
tee of free exercise of religion proscribes governmental interference with religious
practices. 9 As more deaths of children are linked with faith healing practices,
however, public outcry may force state legislatures to reevaluate the extent to
which they allow religious liberty to endanger children.
This note suggests that legislators should remove religious exemptions from
child protection laws or, in the alternative, modify their current laws to ade-
quately protect children from death or serious injury due to faith healing prac-
tices. The exemptions presently found in most state child protection statutes
result in a failure to adequately safeguard the well-being of children. This note
first examines the effects of faith healing practices on children by considering the
experience of an Indiana-based faith healing sect. It then discusses the accommo-
dation of faith healing practices through religious exemptions in state laws, ana-
lyzes constitutional arguments for such exemptions, and examines how the courts
have interpreted and applied these exemptions. Finally, it discusses what
lawmakers can do to protect medically neglected children.
A CASE STUDY OF A FAITH HEALING SECT
The history of the Faith Assembly church graphically illustrates the conse-
quences children can suffer because of faith healing practices. Based in northern
7. ALA. CODE § 26-14-1(2) (1975 & Supp. 1984), § 13A-13-6(b) (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.120(b)
(1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531.01 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-807(c) (1977 & Supp.
1983); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-1-114 (1978); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38d (West 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1104 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 415.503 (7)() (West Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 350-4 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-401(2)
(1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE § 35-46-1-4(a), -
5(c) (Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.6 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3608(1)(c) (1981);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B)(4) (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4010 (Supp.
1984-1985); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-7 01(g)(2) (1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 273, § 1 (Law.
Co-op. 1980); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.634 (West Supp. 1984-1985); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-
21-105(/)(i), (m) (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102(4)
(1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5085 (1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3, XIX (Supp. 1983);
N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:6-1.1 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-3(L)(4), (M)(4) (1981); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 260.15 (McKinney 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(21) (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-
25.1-05.1 (1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Page 1982 & Supp. 1984), § 2151.03 (Page
1976), § 2151.421 (Page 1976 & Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (West Supp. 1984-
1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.500(1) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1984-
1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-15 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(B), (C)(3) (Law, Co-op.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-1.1 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-19.5 (Supp. 1983);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 682(3)(C) (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 16.1-228(A)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1984);
W. VA. CODE § 49-1-3(g)(2)(A) (Supp. 1984); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)(4) (West Supp. 1984-
1985); Wyo. STAT. § 14-3-202(a)(vii) (1978). In five states (Maryland, Montana, Nevada, North Caro-
lina, and South Carolina), the aforementioned statutes do not expressly provide an exemption for
spiritual treatment; however, they allow the use of "non-medical remedial care" in lieu of medical
care if such treatment is recognized or permitted under state law. Each of these states recognizes
spiritual healing practices through some form of accommodation in other state statutes.
8. For example, the Christian Science church maintains a salaried lobbyist in every state. Swan, supra
note 6, at 5.
9. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Indiana, the Faith Assembly congregation includes more than 2,000 members."°
"Satellite churches" have extended the ministry to a dozen Indiana cities, at least
twenty-one other states, and eight foreign countries." The sect instructs its fol-
lowers to shun all forms of medical treatment and rely solely on faith for heal-
ing. 2 Faith Assembly members are taught that to trust in the inventions of man
is to question the power of God.' 3 Consequently, members reject the use of
medicines, refuse vaccinations, spurn life insurance policies, and do not wear seat
belts. "4
Critics have questioned the efficacy of the sect's faith healing dogma. As many
as eighty-eight Faith Assembly deaths have stemmed from treatable illnesses or
injuries over the past eleven years.' 5 Nearly two-thirds of the fatalities involved
children.' 6 The sect attributes the deaths to "God's discipline" in some cases and
to "a complete lack of faith" in others.'"
In 1983, reports of "excessive perinatal and maternal mortality" prompted the
Indiana State Board of Health and the Federal Centers for Disease Control to
investigate the parturition practices of Faith Assembly members in two Indiana
counties.'8 The investigators discovered that pregnant sect members receive no
prenatal care and deliver at home without medical assistance.' 9 The study con-
cluded that the perinatal mortality2" rate for Faith Assembly members in these
two counties between 1975 and 1982 was nearly three times greater than the
statewide rate for non-Faith Assembly members.2 ' Furthermore, perinatal deaths
accounted for more than half of all Faith Assembly deaths in Indiana.22 The
study also found that the maternal mortality23 rate for sect members was almost
100 times greater than that for the remainder of the state.24 The study noted that
10. Spence, Danielson, and Kaunitz, The Faith Assembly: A Study of Perinatal and Maternal Mortality,
INDIANA MED., March 1984, at 180 [hereinafter cited as Mortality Study]. The group's racial compo-
sition is predominantly white. Many members are married couples in their twenties or thirties, are
college educated, and have children. Id.
11. When Faith Lets Children Die, supra note 6, at 32. This expansion is largely due to the sect's distribu-
tion of books and cassette tapes throughout the nation and in several foreign countries.
12. Commonly called "faith-formula" theology, the Faith Assembly asserts that when genuine faith is
exercised and is accompanied by a "positive confession," God will heal one's illness. Any reliance on
nonspiritual treatment signifies a lack of faith. Davis, Inspiration for Living or Invitation to Death?,
Warsaw (Ind.) Times-Union, Sept. 29, 1983, at 1, col. 1. According to the sect's founder, Dr. Hobart
Freeman: "When genuine faith is present it alone will be sufficient, for it will take the place of
medicines and other aids." H. FREEMAN, FAITH FOR HEALING 1 (privately published). Ironically,
Freeman died last December at age 64 after suffering from a month-long illness. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10,
1984, at B14, col. 6.
13. The sect derives this tenet from Jeremiah 17:5: "Thus said the Lord; Cursed be the man that trusteth
in man, and maketh flesh his arm, and whose heart departeth from the Lord."
14. When Faith Lets Children Die, supra note 6, at 32.
15. Id.
16. A Child's Death, supra note 6, at 6.
17. Davis, supra note 12, at 1.
18. Mortality Study, supra note 10. The study examined infant and maternal mortality in Elkhart and
Kosciusko counties. Both counties are located in northeastern Indiana and have large Faith Assembly
populations. Id.
19. Id. at 180-81.
20. Perinatal mortality was defined to include stillbirths (20 weeks gestation and greater) and neonatal
mortality (deaths occurring within 28 days after birth). Id. at 181.
21. Id. at 180-82. Between 1975 and 1982 there were 344 live births born to Faith Assembly women in the
two counties studied and 17 Faith Assembly perinatal deaths (stillborn and neonatal deaths). Thus,
the perinatal mortality rate was 47.9 per 1,000 live births as compared to Indiana's perinatal mortality
rate of 17.8 for non-Faith Assembly births over the same period. Id.
22. Id. at 182.
23. Maternal mortality was defined to include deaths related to pregnancy and occurring in women up to
one year following termination of pregnancy. Id. at 181.
24. Id. at 180-82. Three Faith Assembly women suffered maternal death in the two counties considered
between 1975 and 1982. The maternal mortality rate, given the 344 live births to sect members, was
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the number of Faith Assembly births in the investigated counties had more than
doubled between 1975 and 1982,25 reflecting the sect's increasing popularity
among young married couples.26 If these trends continue, the number of Faith
Assembly perinatal and maternal deaths will presumably increase as well.27
Despite numerous deaths of Faith Assembly children from treatable illnesses,
for many years Indiana prosecutors chose not to file criminal charges against sect
parents.28 They refrained from prosecuting these sect members because of an ex-
emption in Indiana's child neglect and nonsupport laws. The laws provide a de-
fense for a person who, "in the legitimate practice of his religious belief, provided
treatment by spiritual means through prayer, in lieu of medical care, to his depen-
dent. ''29 Members of faith healing sects nationwide have similarly avoided prose-
cution through religious exemptions in state laws. 30 Those who believe in "faith
over medicine" regard these exemptions as legislative endorsements of faith heal-
ing practices.3 '
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS TO CHILD PROTECTION LAWS
Most states have statutes which accommodate the practices of faith healing
sects.3' Although the statutory language varies, every exemption allows some
deviation from secular standards of parental responsibility. For example, Ohio's
criminal code provides that "[i]t is not a violation of a duty of care, protection, or
support" when a parent treats his child's "physical or mental illness or defect...
by spiritual means through prayer alone, in accordance with the tenets of a recog-
nized religious body.",33 Under such statutes, a parent's right to practice his or
her religious beliefs transcends the child's right to receive medical treatment.
Most of the exemptions were enacted in response to regulations promulgated
by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) 34 to implement
Federal child protection legislation. 35 Congress enacted the Child Abuse Preven-
tion and Treatment Act of 197436 to "provide funding for promising efforts to
872 per 100,000 live births, a figure significantly higher than Indiana's statewide rate of nine maternal
deaths per 100,000 live births for non-Faith Assembly members. Id.
25. Id. at 182-83.
26. Id. at 180.
27. If, for example, the absolute number of Faith Assembly births continued to grow at the 1975-1982
pace, sect members would have 860 live births between 1982 and 1989. Assuming constant perinatal
and maternal mortality rates (see supra notes 21, 24), 41 perinatal deaths and seven to eight maternal
deaths would occur over the same period.
28. Not until June 1984 were criminal charges filed against Faith Assembly members for failing to provide
medical care for their children. For further discussion, see infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
29. IND. CODE § 35-46-1-4(a),-5(c) (West Supp. 1981).
30. Few prosecutors have challenged exemption laws through criminal action against faith healing follow-
ers. Courts have ruled that religious exemptions provide a defense to criminal charges. See, e.g., State
v. Lockhart, 664 P.2d 1059 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
31. See, e.g., Cherishing the babe of Christian healing: the need today, 86 CHRISTIAN SC. SENTINEL 1613,
1613-15 (1984) (noting that laws in most states protect "responsible spiritual healing on behalf of
children").
32. See statutes cited supra note 7.
33. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Page 1982 & Supp.1984).
34. The HEW was redesignated as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in 1980. Any
reference to the HEW or its Secretary in any law or regulation is deemed to refer and apply to the
HHS or its Secretary, respectively. 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (1982).
35. 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340 (1975).
36. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4, amended by Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-266, 92 Stat. 205;
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 97 Stat. 357, 488-89 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (1982)).
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prevent, identify and treat child abuse and neglect."37 The Act was a response to
the failure of state and Federal legislators to "focus on child abuse and neglect in
[existing child welfare] programs ... ."38 It provided for the establishment of
the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect to assist public and nonprofit
private agencies in preventing child abuse.39
The HEW regulations that implemented the Act defined "child abuse and ne-
glect" as meaning "harm or threatened harm to a child's health or welfare by a
person responsible for the child's health or welfare."' Although the HEW found
that negligent treatment or maltreatment could constitute "harm or threatened
harm" to a child,41 it made an exception where such treatment was grounded in
religious beliefs. The exemption stated that a parent or guardian who fails to
provide medical treatment for a child based on religious convictions shall not be
deemed negligent.42 Despite public objection to the proposed religious exemp-
tion,43 the HEW concluded that the exception was legitimate and required by the
legislative intent of Congress." Therefore, the HEW's final regulations required
states to modify their statutory definitions of "child abuse and neglect" to provide
a religious exemption in order to be eligible for Federal funding for child protec-
tion programs under the Act. 5
To qualify for Federal funding, most states amended their child protection
laws to include religious exemptions.4 6 Although several states adopted the
37. STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, 93D. CONG., 2D SESS., CHILD ABUSE
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT AcT, 1974 1 (Comm. Print 1974).
38. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 5101(b) (1982). The Center publishes information and training material for personnel
engaged in this field and conducts research into the causes of child abuse and neglect and into methods
of prevention, identification, and treatment. Id.
40. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(b) (1975).
41. Id. § 1340.1-2(b)(1) (1975).
42. Id. The exemption provided:
[T]hat a parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who thereby does not
provide specified medical treatment for a child, for that reason alone shall not be considered a
negligent parent or guardian; However, such an exception shall not preclude a court from or-
dering that medical services be provided to the child, where his health requires it.
Id. (emphasis in original).
43. See Proposed Rules for the Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 39 Fed.
Reg. 31,507 (1974). In addition to comments objecting to the inclusion of the exemption, another
comment sought a similar exception where poverty was the sole reason for the parent's failure to
provide medical treatment. Furthermore, the question was raised whether the proposed religious ex-
emption would prohibit court-ordered medical treatment. In response to the latter concern, the HEW
amended § 1340.1-2(b)(1) to include the following: "[S]uch an exception shall not preclude a court
from ordering that medical services be provided to the child, where his health requires it." The HEW
declined to extend the grounds for the exemption to poverty. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention
and Treatment Program, 39 Fed. Reg. 43,935-36 (1974).
44. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 39 Fed. Reg. 43,935-36 (1974). The
Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor on the Child Abuse Prevention and Treat-
ment Act contained the following:
[T]he Committee recognized that "negligent treatment" is difficult to define, but it is not the
intent of the Committee that a parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs
who thereby does not provide specific medical treatment for a child is for that reason alone
considered to be a negligent parent. To clarify further, no parent or guardian who in good faith
is providing to a child treatment solely by spiritual means - such as prayer - according to the
tenets and practices of a recognized church through a duly accredited practitioner shall for that
reason alone be considered to have neglected the child.
H. REP. No. 685, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1973) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as House
Committee Report].
45. Although the Act itself does not include a religious exemption in its definition of "child abuse and
neglect," it authorizes the Secretary of the HEW (HHS) to determine a suitable definition. 42 U.S.C.
§ 5102 (1982). Under the regulations, states must adopt a definition which is "the same in substance"
as the one promulgated by the Secretary. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.3-3(b) (1975).
46. See statutes cited supra note 7.
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HEW's exemption language verbatim, 47 most states drafted more restrictive ex-
ceptions.48 Whereas the HEW's suggested exemption provided that parental inac-
tion shall not constitute child neglect, the more restrictive state statutes require
some parental action in affirmatively exercising religious beliefs. For example,
Idaho's exemption provides "that the practice of a parent or guardian who
chooses for his child treatment by prayer or spiritual means alone shall not for
that reason alone be construed to be a violation of the duty of care to such
child."49 Similarly, most states compel parents who object to conventional medi-
cal care to use some form of spiritual treatment in lieu thereof."
In 1983, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (formerly the
HEW) issued new regulations which implemented amendments to the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act.5 ' The new regulations amended the defini-
tion of "negligent treatment or maltreatment" to include failure to provide medi-
cal care. 52 These regulations required states to amend their child protection laws
to include the "failure to provide adequate medical care" as a reportable condi-
tion.5 3 Therefore, under the new regulations, failure to provide medical treatment
constitutes child abuse and neglect and must be reported to a child protection
agency or other authority regardless of the grounds for withholding such
treatment.54
In addition, the new regulations no longer require states to provide religious
exemptions to their child protection laws in order to qualify for Federal funding.
However, they fail to mandate medical care for children as an eligibility require-
ment." After reevaluating the religious exemption requirement in light of public
47. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-1(2) (1975 & Supp. 1984).
48. The HEW clearly allowed for variation in exemptions among states. The 1975 regulations state:
[N]othing in [these regulations] is intended to prevent a State from further elaborating on the
definition or from providing additional grounds to consider a child abused or neglected ...
[T]his approach [recognizes) the need to allow and encourage flexibility and innovation in light
of the diverse local conditions found from State to State and community to community.
45 C.F.R. § 1340.3-3(b) (1975).
49. IDAHO CODE § 18-401(2) (1979).
50. Most states further narrow the scope of the religious exception by exempting spiritual treatment only
if done "in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomina-
tion." VA. CODE § 16.1-228(A)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
The majority of these states additionally require that spiritual treatment be performed by a "duly
accredited practitioner" of such a recognized religious denomination. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 270 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-114 (1978); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 350-4 (1976).
A few states have gone so far as to exempt only Christian Science treatment from their child neglect
laws. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531.01 (1974). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
38d (West 1975) (treatment by a Christian Science practitioner does not constitute maltreatment for
purposes of child abuse reporting requirements). Such limitations have provoked constitutional chal-
lenges under the first amendment establishment clause. See infra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
51. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program; Final Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 3697 (1983)
(amending 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340) [hereinafter cited as Final Rule]. The new regulations implemented
amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act contained in Title I of the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-266, 92 Stat. 205
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (1982)).
52. The definition is currently as follows: " 'Negligent treatment or maltreatment' includes failure to
provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care." 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(3)(i) (1983) (empha-
sis added).
53. Final Rule, supra note 51, at 3699.
54. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(c) (1983). The HHS concluded that a failure to provide children with the neces-
sities of life (adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care) necessitates reporting of such to appro-
priate authorities. It found congressional support for its conclusion in the language of the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. Final Rule, supra note 51, at 3699. See also 42 U.S.C. 5102
(1982) (defining "child abuse and neglect" as "circumstances which indicate that the child's health or
welfare is harmed or threatened thereby").
55. The amended regulation, in pertinent part, is as follows:
Nothing in this part should be construed as requiring or prohibiting a finding of negligent treat-
ment or maltreatment when a parent practicing his or her religious beliefs does not, for that
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objection" and congressional intent,57 the HHS concluded that the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act did not require such an eligibility provision5" and
amended the regulations so that a religious exemption was neither required nor
prohibited. 59 Although each state is now free to formulate its own definition of
negligent treatment or maltreatment of children, few states have taken the initia-
tive to amend their laws by modifying or removing religious exemptions.'
The current HHS regulations do not ensure that state laws will protect chil-
dren from medical neglect. Since each state has complete discretion on whether to
retain these exemptions, the HHS has failed to instigate statutory reform. In-
stead, the new regulations have fostered inconsistent state legislation. To be eligi-
ble for Federal funding under the Act, the HHS requires states to have legislation
which obliges specified persons to report known and suspected instances of child
abuse and neglect-including the failure, for whatever reason, to provide adequate
medical care.61 At the same time, the HHS allows states to prohibit a finding of
negligent treatment when parents fail to obtain medical treatment for their chil-
dren due to religious beliefs.
This inconsistency reflects the underlying tension inherent in child protection
legislation. By establishing measures through which potential harm to children
can be detected and avoided, the HHS attempts to protect the health and welfare
of children. Conversely, by allowing states to provide religious exceptions to
health care requirements, it respects the parental rights and religious liberties that
states choose to give their residents. Thus, while the HHS regulations offer some
protection for children, they fall short of assuring medical treatment for all
children.
FAITH HEALING PRACTICES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Faith healing proponents vigorously defend their "right" to withhold medical
care from children, citing the first amendment's guarantee of free exercise of reli-
gion. 62 They also point to the traditional prominence of familial privacy in our
society. 63 As opposition to faith healing practices intensifies, the point at which
reason alone, provide medical treatment for a child; provided, however, that if such a finding is
prohibited, the prohibition shall not limit the administrative or judicial authority of the State to
insure that medical services are provided to the child when his health requires it.
45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(3)(ii) (1983) (emphasis added).
56. Objections received by the HHS included: (1) children suffer and die from medically preventable
illnesses due to the spiritual healing practices of their parents; (2) the religious exception impedes
discovery of ill children, thus inhibiting the efficacy of court-ordered treatment; (3) the exception
denies children their constitutional right to life and to equal protection of the law. Final Rule, supra
note 51, at 3699.
57. See House Committee Report, supra note 44.
58. Final Rule, supra note 51, at 3700.
59. See regulation cited supra note 55.
60. Most states have retained their exemptions. See statutes cited supra note 7. One state which did
modify its laws is Oklahoma, which amended its child protection legislation by qualifying its religious
exemption. The law now requires "that medical care shall be provided where permanent physical
damage could result to such child." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (West Supp. 1984-85). See infra
note 162 for text of the amended exemption. See also infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text
(discussing legislative efforts to amend religious exemptions in Ohio and Indiana).
61. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d) (1983).
62. According to the founder of the Christian Science church: "The Constitution of the United States
does not provide that materia medica shall make laws to regulate man's religion; rather does it imply
that religion shall permeate our laws." MARY BAKER EDDY, THE FIRST CHURCH OF CHRIST, SCIEN-
TIST, AND MISCELLANY 222 (1913) (quoted in Cherishing the babe of Christian healing: the need
today, 86 CHRISTIAN SCI. SENTINEL 1613 (1984)).
63. A recent Federal study described the concept of familial privacy as follows:
Familial privacy has received increasing protection from law throughout this century. In the
earlier stages of legal development, the source of this protection was sometimes found in the
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parental rights must yield in order to protect children will be increasingly de-
bated. 64 Opponents of faith healing practices contend that children must be af-
forded greater protection through medical treatment as a matter of public
policy.6
Increased protection, however, may require some restriction on the free exer-
cise of religion. 6 6 In Reynolds v. United States,67 the Court distinguished between
religious beliefs and religiously motivated acts. 68  In rejecting free exercise as a
defense to criminal conduct, the Court stated that to do otherwise "would be to
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land
. 69 Although the language of the free exercise clause is absolute,7 ° the be-
constitutional right of religious freedom; it has gradually evolved into a more secular protection
generally referred to as the right of privacy. The substantive core includes the authority of
parents to establish family values, to set goals for the family and for its individual members,
and to make decisions affecting the welfare of family members free from interference by agen-
cies of the state. . . . The society as a whole benefits from promoting diversity, and privacy
law has played an increasing role in protecting diverse life-styles and values.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, A REPORT
ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 212 n.63 (1983) [herein-
after cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION]. See also Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected"
Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 989 (1975). For cases upholding
parental rights as constitutionally protected liberties, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(right to raise a child); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents' right to direct the
education of their children): Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (parents' right to direct the
religious upbringing of their children). These liberty interests were later expanded to a more general
right to familial privacy. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (qualified right to terminate pregnancy).
64. "[Tlhere is a presumption, strong, but rebuttable, that parents are the appropriate decisionmakers for
their infants. Traditional law, buttressed by the emerging constitutional right of privacy, protects a
substantial range of discretion for parents." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 63, at 212.
Although "natural bonds of affection" usually lead parents to act in their children's best interest, "a
state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their
physical or mental health is jeopardized." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
65. Courts have held that a state has an independent interest in the well-being of minors. Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968). See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944); Bennett,
Allocation of Child Medical Care Decision-making Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L.
REV. 285, 317-19 (1976).
66. The intent of the "framers" of the Constitution regarding the scope of the free exercise clause is
unclear. See Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981
UTAH L. REV. 309, 311-17 (discussing the historical circumstances surrounding the drafting of the
religion clauses). The framers never specifically limited the free exercise clause. Id. at 315-17.
67. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, a Mormon was convicted of bigamy, a practice prohibited by federal
law. Since bigamy was an accepted doctrine of the Mormon Church, Reynolds contended that the law
infringed on his constitutional right to free exercise of religion. Id. at 161-62. Reynolds had requested
the court to instruct the jury to find him not guilty if his multiple marriages were "in pursuance of and
in conformity with what he believed. . . to be a religious duty." Id. The court refused to allow the
jury to consider religious belief as a defense, which Reynolds contested on free exercise grounds. Id.
at 162. For a discussion of the rationale behind the doctrine of polygamy, see Linford, The Mormons
and the Law: The Polygamy Cases, 9 UTAH L. REV. 308, 308-11 (1964). See also id. at 311-30 (exam-
ining the history of legislative action taken in response to the practice of polygamy).
68. 98 U.S. at 164-67. The Court considered the scope of the religious freedom guaranteed by the first
amendment and concluded that while "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opin-
ion, [it] was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order." Id. at 164.
The court adopted the views of Thomas Jefferson in interpreting the meaning of the free exercise
clause. According to Jefferson, government could not interfere with religious beliefs, but could restrict
religiously motivated acts which affect the order of society: "[M]an... has no natural right in oppo-
sition to his social duties." Id. (quoting Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists).
69. Id. at 167.
70. Pepper, supra note 66, at 370, n. 249: "Other provisions of the Bill of Rights explicitly provide flexibil-
ity: 'right of the people peaceably to assemble' (first amendment); security against 'unreasonable
searches and seizures' (fourth amendment); 'due process of law' and 'just compensation' (fifth amend-
meat). (Emphasis added). The free exercise clause does not explicitly offer such flexibility."
Faith Healing Exemptions
lief-action dichotomy announced in Reynolds significantly limited the protections
afforded to religious practices and resulted in the enforcement of secular regula-
tions regardless of their impact on religiously motivated acts. 7 1
In Cantwell v. Connecticut,72 the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the
free exercise clause by determining that it embraces two distinct concepts-the
freedom to believe and the freedom to act.73 By interpreting the free exercise
clause to safeguard religious actions as well as beliefs, the Court abandoned the
strict belief-action dichotomy of Reynolds. The Court, however, established sepa-
rate levels of first amendment protection, holding that the freedom to believe is
absolute, whereas the freedom to act must be qualified.74 The Court stated that
religious conduct must remain subject to regulation for the protection of society.75
The Court limited, however, the government's ability to regulate religiously moti-
vated acts and emphasized that regulation must avoid undue infringement on pro-
tected freedoms.7 6 The Court did not define the point at which regulations
"unduly infringe" upon religion.
In 1963, the Supreme Court delivered a more definite standard by which to
evaluate free exercise claims. In Sherbert v. Verner,77 the Court held that only a
compelling state interest in a regulation could justify burdening an individual's
free exercise of religion." The Court concluded that governmental regulations
could not infringe on religious practices absent such an interest.79 Nine years
later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,"° the Court reaffirmed this standard and again re-
quired a secular regulation to exempt certain religious conduct in order to accom-
modate free exercise. In Yoder, members of the Amish faith were convicted of
violating Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law, which required parents
to send their children to public or private school until age sixteen."s Amish beliefs
do not permit formal education beyond the eighth grade.2 The Court held that
71. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Lyle, 30 F.2d 971 (W.D. Wash. 1929) (restrictions placed on the use of sacramen-
tal wine during Prohibition not violative of first amendment religious freedoms); Scoles v. State, 47
Ark. 476, 1 S.W. 769 (1886) (Seventh-Day Adventist's abstention from working on Saturday no de-
fense to the violation of statute declaring Sunday as a day of rest); Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa.
132, 78 A. 68 (1910) (wearing of religious dress or insignia by teachers in public schools may be
prohibited by statute).
72. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
73. Id. at 303. In Cantwell, three Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted for soliciting contributions in viola-
tion of a licensing statute. The Court held that censorship of religion through restrictions placed on
religious activity violated the first amendment. Id. at 305.
74. Id. at 303-04. The Court also held that the "fundamental concept of liberty" embodied in the four-
teenth amendment incorporated the free exercise clause of the first amendment, thus binding state
legislatures. Id. at 303.
75. Id. at 304.
76. Id. In Reynolds a secular end justified any regulation, but in Cantwell the Court concerned itself with
the adverse effects that regulations may have on religious activity.
77. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
78. Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
79. Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, had been discharged by her employer for
refusing to work on Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith. Sherbert filed for unemployment compen-
sation after unsuccessfully trying to obtain employment that did not require Saturday work. South
Carolina denied her benefits based on a statute that disallowed compensation when one failed to accept
suitable work without "good cause." Id. at 399-402.
The Court found that the South Carolina statute violated Sherbert's free exercise rights. After
determining that the denial of unemployment benefits constituted a burden on the free exercise of her
religion, the Court then considered whether some compelling state interest was served by the law. Id.
at 403-05. The Court concluded that South Carolina had no such interest, and intimated that even if
it had an interest sufficiently compelling, the state has the burden of demonstrating that less restrictive
forms of regulation are unavailable. Id. at 406-07.
80. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
81. Id. at 207-08. The parents refused to send their children, ages 14 and 15, to school after they had
completed the eighth grade. Id. at 207.
82. The Amish believe in simple living, with members obligated to make their living by farming or other
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the state's interest in compulsory education of Amish children past the eighth
grade did not outweigh the burden that the regulation imposed upon the free exer-
cise of religion.83 The Court did not find the compulsory education requirement
unconstitutional in general application, but specifically limited its decision to re-
quiring an Amish exception to the law, citing the adequacy of Amish informal
vocational training.84
Although free exercise doctrine has been significantly expanded since Reyn-
olds,"5 states remain free to regulate religiously motivated' activity in order to pro-
mote health, safety, and the general welfare.86 The first amendment does not
protect practices that threaten the safety or order of society. Thus, courts have
upheld laws prohibiting the handling of poisonous snakes, even if done as part of
religious services.8 7 Courts have also held that the free exercise clause does not
permit illegal drug use.88
Furthermore, courts have been more willing to curtail religious activity when
the health or general welfare of children is implicated. The landmark case con-
cerning governmental protection of children is Prince v. Massachusetts.8 9  In
Prince, a Jehovah's Witness was convicted of violating Massachusetts' child labor
laws for permitting a child under her guardianship to distribute religious literature
on public sidewalks. 9° The Supreme Court assessed the competing interests
presented in the case:
related activities. The Amish oppose formal high school education because "it places Amish children
in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs with increasing emphasis on competition . . . [and] also
because it takes them away from their community, physically and emotionally, during the crucial and
formative adolescent period of life." The Amish emphasize informal "learning-through-doing" which
prepares young people for the Amish way of life. Id. at 210-11.
83. Id. at 234-36. Although the Court recognized the state's power to establish requirements for basic
education, it added that "a State's interest in universal education.., is not totally free from a balanc-
ing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests .... " Id. at 213-14. The Court
determined that "fundamental rights and interests" included first amendment free exercise rights and
parental rights concerning the religious upbringing of their children. Id. at 214. In weighing the
competing interests, the Court found a strong state interest in compulsory education, but one that "is
by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests." Id. at 215. The Court
then examined the regulation's impact on the Amish faith and determined that the compulsory-educa-
tion law substantially interfered with the basic religious tenets and practices of the Amish faith. Id. at
218.
84. Central to the Court's decision was the Amish community's "long history as a successful and self-
sufficient segment of American society .. " Id. at 235. The Court carefully qualified its holding in
Yoder by stating: "It cannot be overemphasized that we are not dealing with a way of life and mode of
education by a group claiming to have recently discovered some 'progressive' or more enlightened
process for rearing children for modern life." Id. Noting that the case was decided "in the wake of
the turbulent late sixties," one commentator observed that "the 'countercultural' movement was
before the eyes of the Court, and its opinion appears to want to say 'yes' to the Amish while saying 'no'
to the hippies." Pepper, supra note 66, at 335.
85. Of first amendment liberties, only the free exercise clause has sheltered criminal action from prosecu-
tion. Pepper, supra note 66, at 344.
86. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-04
(1961).
87. State ex. rel Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976); Harden v.
State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948); Hill v. State, 38 Ala. Ct. App. 404, 88 So.2d 880, cert.
denied, 88 So.2d 887 (1956).
88. Town v. State, 377 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1979) (use of cannabis); Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th
Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (use of marijuana). Contra People v. Woody, 61
Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (requiring an exemption for the sacramental use of
peyote by an American Indian religion). For a discussion of these cases, see Comment, Free Exercise
of Religion: Will it go up in Smoke?, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 581 (1980).
89. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
90. Id. at 159-63. Prince asserted that it was the child's religious duty as a Jehovah's Witness to "preach
the gospel" in this manner. Id. at 162-63. In addition to free exercise liberties, the case also involved
parental rights secured by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (parents' right to instruct their children in a foreign language is
within the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment).
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On one side is the obviously earnest claim for freedom of conscience and reli-
gious practice. With it is allied the parent's claim to authority in her own
household and in the rearing of her children . . . Against these sacred pri-
vate interests, basic in a democracy, stand the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children, and the state's assertion of authority to that end .... 91
In weighing these interests, the Court emphasized that parents have great freedom
in "the custody, care and nurture" of their children and that the state should
respect familial privacy.92 It added, however, that "the family itself is not beyond
regulation in the public interest . . .[a]nd neither rights of religion nor rights of
parenthood are beyond limitation."93 The state as parenspatriae94 may intervene
into the realm of the family when a child's welfare is at stake. The Court stated:
The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the com-
munity or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or
death95. . . .Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow they are free . . .to make martyrs of their children before they
have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that
choice for themselves.
96
Thus, in Prince, the Supreme Court clearly established that neither first amend-
ment rights nor parental rights include the right to impair the welfare of a child.
JUDICIAL REACTION TO WITHHOLDING MEDICAL
CARE FROM CHILDREN
Although courts have required exemptions from secular law under the free
exercise clause,97 they have consistently held that one's free exercise of religion
must not interfere with the rights of others,98 especially where religious practices
injure children.99 Courts have long recognized that religion affords no defense to
a statutory obligation to provide medical care for dependent children."°° Early
American cases held parents criminally liable for failing to provide medical care
91. 321 U.S. at 165.
92. Id. at 166 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
93. Id. at 166. The Court upheld the conviction, holding that the state may limit parental freedom and
authority where such parental control adversely affects a child's welfare. The Court concluded that
Massachusetts had a "legitimate" interest in, and therefore had power broad enough to impose, an
absolute prohibition on child labor, whether religiously motivated or not. Id. at 170. Since Prince pre-
dated Sherbert by almost 20 years, a compelling state interest was not required by the Court.
94. Under the doctrine ofparens patriae, the state has the right and duty to act as "the general guardian of
all infants, idiots and lunatics." Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (quoting 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47).
95. 321 U.S. at 166-67 (citing People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903)).
96. Id. at 170.
97. The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of laws which accommodate the practices of
specific religions. See, e.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (upholding exemptions
from military service); Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding tax exemptions for
religious organizations); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (allowing public schools to release
students during school hours to attend religious classes). See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (supra
notes 80-84 and accompanying text).
98. According to the Supreme Court in Cantwell: "When clear and present danger of riot, disorder,
interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or
order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious." 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
99. See Prince, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See also infra notes 104 and 122-127 and accompanying text.
100. In the English case of The Queen v. Senior, 1 Q.B. 283 (1899), a member of a faith healing sect who
failed to provide his infant child with medical care was convicted of manslaughter after the child had
died of diarrhea and pneumonia. The Queen's Bench affirmed the conviction, disregarding the good
intentions of the parent in light of his statutory duty to provide medical aid for his child. Id. at 288-
92.
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in contravention of child protection statutes. In People v. Pierson,'0 the court
interpreted the statutory duty to furnish medical attendance as requiring a parent,
regardless of religious convictions, to seek medical assistance at the time when an
ordinarily prudent person would do so.1° 2 Under the Reynolds belief-action di-
chotomy, the court held that a parent could not escape criminal liability because
the failure to provide medical care was religiously motivated.1
0 3
Courts generally grant parents greater freedom in the practice of their reli-
gious beliefs when the child's illness is not life-threatening. In such cases, courts
are reluctant to invade the realm of family life, but will order treatment in egre-
gious instances."0 For example, courts have allowed parents to withhold surgical
treatment for religious reasons when a child is deformed but not in imminent
danger of death.'° 5 Moreover, the courts usually will not interfere when parental
objections are based on legitimate concerns about the efficacy or safety of the
treatment. '
0 6
In In re Appeal in Cochise County Juvenile Action No. 5666-J,10 7 a woman's
seven children had been declared dependent under Arizona law'0 8 by the Arizona
Court of Appeals after one of her children died from a preventable malady.'0 9
The woman had not sought medical assistance for her deceased son, relying in-
stead on "miracles" to safeguard her children.'"° Although the court authorized
state intervention to protect the surviving children from future fatalities,"' the
101. 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
102. 68 N.E. at 244.
103. Id. at 246-47. "The peace and safety of the state involve the protection of the lives and health of its
children, as well as the obedience to its laws. . . . [A person] cannot, under the belief or profession of
belief that he should be relieved from the care of children, be excused from punishment for slaying
those who have been born to him." Id. at 246. See also Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 110, 116 P. 345
(1911).
104. See, e.g., Muhlenberg Hospital v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974) (court ordered
blood transfusion on infant to prevent brain damage). See also In re Jensen, 54 Or. App. 1, 633 P.2d
1302 (1981) (discussed infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text (court ordered surgery on infant to
prevent retardation)).
105. See In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (severe curvature of the spine resulted in child's
inability to stand or ambulate); In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955) (child's cleft palate
and harelip affected his appearance and ability to speak). But see In re Sampson, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323
N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd per curtain, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972)
(upholding order authorizing surgery to correct child's facial disfigurement in order that child may
lead normal life).
106. In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561 (Quar. Sess. Ct. 1912); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765
(1942).
107. 133 Ariz. 157, 650 P.2d 459 (1982).
108. According to Arizona law:
"Dependent child" means a child who is adjudicated to be: (a) In need of proper and effective
parental care and control and has no parent or guardian, or one who has no parent or guardian
willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care and control. (b) Destitute or who is not
provided with the necessities of life, or who is not provided with a home or suitable place of
abode, or whose home is unfit for him by reason of abuse, neglect, cruelty or depravity by either
of his parents, his guardian, or other person having his custody or care.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN § 8-201(1) (Supp. 1974-1984) (formerly codified at § 8-201(10)).
109. In re Appeal in Cochise County Juvenile Action No. 5666-J, 133 Ariz. 165, 650 P.2d 467 (1981),
vacated, 133 Ariz. 157, 650 P.2d 459 (1982). The child was pronounced "dead on arrival" at a hospi-
tal emergency room. The abdomen of the six-year-old child had swelled to the size of a basketball and
fecal material in his mouth indicated prolonged or severe vomiting. An autopsy revealed that the
death of the child had resulted from a strangulated inguinal hernia. Part of his intestine had pro-
truded through a defect in the abdominal wall and had become caught. The blood supply decreased to
the area, causing tissue death and ultimately a rupture of the bowel. Digestive material then entered
the abdominal cavity resulting in infection and eventually death. 650 P.2d at 467. The condition is
treatable in its early stages without surgery by pushing the hernia back into the abdominal cavity. In
later stages, the problem can be corrected by relatively safe and simple surgery. Id.
110. Id. at 468.
111. Id. at 469-70. The court of appeals held that the state may intervene to ensure that her surviving
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Supreme Court of Arizona vacated the appellate court's opinion and held that the
state cannot abridge religious freedoms and parental rights unless the welfare of a
child is seriously jeopardized." 2 The court found no evidence of illness among
the surviving children and therefore determined that the woman's refusal to agree
to provide medical treatment in the future did not make her a negligent parent.113
Because the children appeared to be healthy and not in imminent danger,1 14 the
court allowed the parent to retain legal custody and control of her children." 5
The Supreme Court of Colorado recently reached a similar result in its first
ruling in People in the Interest of D.L.E. (D.L.E. 1).116 D.L.E.'s adoptive mother
had refused, for religious reasons, to obtain medical treatment for D.L.E., who
suffered from recurring seizure activity." 7 As a result, a juvenile court adjudi-
cated D.L.E. a dependent child under Colorado law.1 1 Relying on the religious
exemption in the state's Children's Code," 9 the Colorado Supreme Court re-
versed, recognizing the mother's right to refuse medical treatment for D.L.E. on
religious grounds. 2 0 The court limited its decision, however, by emphasizing that
D.L.E.'s condition did not pose imminent danger to his life. 12'
In 1982, the matter returned to the Colorado Supreme Court 1 2 2 due to
D.L.E.'s degenerating condition. 12 3 The court examined its prior decision in light
children would receive medical care. The court stressed that "the passive conduct involved here
[should] not be confused with the absence of abuse." Id. at 469.
112. 650 P.2d at 463.
113. Id.
114. The court emphasized that evidence of an actual illness to one of the children would have resulted in a
finding of dependency. Id. at 463, 466.
115. For a more detailed discussion of the case, see Note, Medical Dependency in Arizona: The "Known
Medical Danger" Standard of In re Cochise County Juvenile Action No. 5666-J, 25 ARIZ. L. REV 769
(1983).
116. 614 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1980).
117. Id. at 873. D.L.E., a twelve year old boy, suffered brain damage at the time of his birth which resulted
in recurring instances of grand mal epileptic seizures. His mother was a member of the General
Assembly and Church of the Living Born, a sect which equates seeking medical aid with a lack of faith
in the teachings of the church. Id.
118. Id. at 874. Section 19-1-103(20) of the Children's Code provides: " 'Neglected or dependent child' or
'dependent or neglected child' means a child:. . . (d) Whose parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails
or refuses to provide proper or necessary subsistence, education, or medical care, or any other care
necessary for his health, guidance, or well-being. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103(20) (1978).
119. The exemption provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no child who in good faith is under treatment
solely by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recog-
nized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof shall, for that
reason alone, be considered to have been neglected within the purview of this title.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-114 (1978).
120. 614 P.2d at 874. The court held that the religious exception precluded the trial court from finding
D.L.E. a neglected or dependent child. The trial court had ruled that while the religious exception
barred a finding of neglect under § 19-1-103(20) (supra note 118), it did not prevent a finding of
dependency. The court here ruled that by using the terms neglected and dependent interchangeably in
the section, the legislature intended that " 'neglected or dependent child' or 'dependent or neglected
child' " would represent a single concept. Thus, the exception precluded a finding of dependency. Id.
121. Whether the religious exception would apply where a child's life was imminently endangered due to a
lack of medical care was left open by the court. Id. at 874-75. The court also noted that the treatment
of epileptic seizures could produce damaging side effects, the risk of which militates against treatment.
Id. at 875.
122. People in the Interest of D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982) [hereinafter D.LE. II].
123. While the appeal in D.LE. I was pending, D.L.E. stopped taking medication in violation of the lower
court's order (the order adjudicating D.L.E. dependent was not stayed pending its appeal and there-
fore remained in effect during the appeal. Id. at 273, n. 1). As a result, the child went into a state of
status epilepticus, a condition characterized by continual seizures. Because of the frequency of seizure
activity, the right side of D.L.E.'s brain was not functioning at least 40 percent of the time. In addi-
tion, a stroke had caused permanent paralysis of his left arm and leg, a nerve injury which restricted
movement in his right arm, and a dislocated jaw. Id. at 273.
When the county Department of Social Services again filed a petition in district court alleging that
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of the child's existing condition 2 4 and concluded that the religious exception did
not apply when faith healing practices threaten a child's life, thus carving out an
"exception" to the exception. 25 D.L.E. and his mother contended that such an
interpretation of the statute violated their first amendment right to free exercise of
religion. The court rejected their contention, noting that neither religious free-
doms nor parental rights are beyond limitation.126 The court held that in situa-
tions where a minor's life is threatened, the state's interest in protecting the well-
being of children forces spiritual healing to yield to medical treatment.,
27
The court in D.LE. II concluded that certain "additional reasons" may result
in a finding of dependency and neglect despite the exemption's accommodation
for faith healing practices. Under the court's interpretation of the exemption, the
state may not consider a child neglected for the sole reason that spiritual treatment
is used instead of medical care. Exactly what other reasons would justify a finding
of neglect was left open by the court.In In re Jensen,128 parents refused to consent to surgical treatment for their
daughter because of religious objections.129 A circuit court judge ordered that the
D.L.E. was dependent and neglected, the court granted a motion to dismiss the petition. Based on the
supreme court's ruling in D.LE. I the district court concluded that the religious exemption prevented
a finding of dependency or neglect, even though D.L.E.'s life was endangered. Id. The Department
appealed the ruling.
124. In rejecting arguments that resjudicata or collateral estoppel barred the redetermination of the issues
regarding dependency and neglect, the court stated: "[T]here has been no final judicial determination
of the new factual basis and legal issues arising out of the change in D.L.E.'s medical condition to a
life-endangering situation." Id. at 273-74.
125. Id. at 274. The district court had concluded that "no mode of logic" allowed for a different interpreta-
tion of the religious exception when a child's life was endangered. The supreme court rejected this
notion and drew a distinction between life-threatening and non-life-threatening religious practices. Id.
The supreme court reached its conclusion by focusing on the language of section 114 of the Colorado
Code which provides that a child cannot be adjudicated as neglected solely for the reason that only
spiritual treatment is provided. See statute cited supra note 119. According to the court, the meaning
of the provision is "quite clear:"
[A] child who is treated solely by spiritual means is not, for that reason alone, dependent or
neglected, but if there is an additional reason, such as where the child is deprived of medical
care necessary to prevent a life-endangering condition, the child may be adjudicated dependent
and neglected under the statutory scheme.
D.L.E. II, 645 P.2d at 274-75.
Affidavits from physicians who had treated D.L.E. indicated that his state of continued seizure
activity endangered his life. The uncontrolled seizure activity had caused severe physical and psycho-
logical damage. D.L.E. suffered from extensive brain damage which weakened his body and impaired
his motor coordination. His seizure activity also presented potential threats to his life through aspira-
tion or injuries due to falls. Id. at 275. Thus, the court held that section 114 did not preclude a finding
of dependency and neglect in the case of D.L.E.
126. Id. at 275-76 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
127. In In re Hamilton, 657 S.W. 2d 425 (Tenn. App. 1983), a Tennessee appellate court reached a similar
conclusion in a case involving a 12-year-old girl suffering from a form of cancer known as Ewing's
Sarcoma. The girl's family belonged to the Church of God of the Union Assembly, and they refused
to provide medical treatment due to the sect's faith healing tenet. Testimony indicated that without
such treatment, the child would die within six to nine months. The appellate court upheld the trial
court's decision declaring the girl a dependent and neglected child under Tennessee law. The court
held that the state as parens patriae has a special duty to protect minors and make decisions on their
behalf where life-threatening situations are involved. Id. at 429.
128. 54 Or. App. 1, 633 P.2d 1302 (1981).
129. 633 P.2d at 1303. The parents were members of the General Assembly and Church of the First Born.
Sara Helen Jensen, a 15-month-old child, suffered from hydrocephalus, a condition in which fluid is
retained in the cranium. As a result, her head had become abnormally enlarged to the point where she
was unable to sit up or to hold her head up without assistance. If left untreated, the increased pressure
on the brain caused by hydrocephalus often results in reduced brain function. Id.
Unlike the situation in D.LE. II, Sara Helen Jensen's life was not in immediate danger due to her
condition. The court of appeals determined, however, that retardation could result if the condition
was not treated, affecting the child's ability to lead a normal life. The recommended treatment for
hydrocephalus involves a shunting procedure in which surgeons insert plastic tubing into a hollow
area of the brain to drain the fluid into other parts of the body. Three or four additional surgeries are
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child be placed in the legal and physical custody of a state agency for medical
treatment pursuant to statutory authority. 30 After first rejecting the contention
that the statutory language was impermissibly vague,'' the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals addressed the parents' argument that the statutes, as applied by the lower
court, violated constitutionally protected religious freedoms and familial rights.
The court held that the burden imposed on the child in the interest of faith ex-
ceeded the limits of parental and religious freedoms as enunciated in Prince.'32
Although the child's life was not in imminent danger, the court determined that
her parents' faith healing practices posed a risk sufficiently serious to justify state
intervention. The court concluded: "The facts as we find them are that the most
basic quality of the child's life is endangered by the course the parents wish to
follow. Their rights must yield."' 33
Jensen and D.L.E. H demonstrate that courts have readily ordered medical
treatment for seriously ill children over the objections of their parents. When
children have died as a result of faith healing practices, however, courts have
been less willing to hold parents criminally responsible. Even prior to the rise of
religious exemptions in child protection laws, appellate courts usually reversed the
convictions of well-intentioned parents.134 Over the past several years, state reli-
gious exemptions have reduced both prosecutions 135 and convictions 36 of parents
whose faith healing practices resulted in the deaths of their children. Courts have
become, however, increasingly suspect of these exemptions. In Colorado v.
Lybarger,137 the court struck down Colorado's spiritual healing exemption to its
child protection law, ruling that the exemption violated the establishment clause
necessary during childhood to adjust the tubing to accommodate for the child's growth. Although the
court noted that there was a "statistical possibility" of brain collapse, it did not consider the surgery a
high-risk procedure. Id.
130. The statutes involved were Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 419.476(l)(c) and 419.500(1). The former
provides: "(1) The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in any case involving a person who
is under 18 years of age and: .. .(c) Whose behavior, condition or circumstances are such as to
endanger his own welfare or the welfare of others. OR. REV. STAT. § 419.476(l)(c) (1981). The
latter provides in pertinent part:
The practice of a parent who chooses for himself or his child treatment by prayer or spiritual
means alone shall not be construed as a failure to provide physical care ...but shall not
prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising that jurisdiction under paragraph (c)
of subsection (1) of ORS 419.476 ....
OR. REV. STAT. § 419.500(1) (1981).
131. The Jensens argued that the statutes in question created an impermissibly vague standard which (1)
failed to adequately warn what conduct is proscribed, (2) allowed arbitrary enforcement, and (3) in-
hibited the free exercise of religion. 633 P.2d at 1304. The court held that language of § 419.476(1)(c)
was "precise enough to give adequate notice to the parents and to guide the court's discretion ...."
Id. at 1305. It also concluded that § 419.500(1) did not inject vagueness into the statutory scheme.
Id.
132. Id. at 1305-06.
133. Id. at 1306.
134. Courts have frequently reversed convictions for manslaughter and neglect when parental action is
based on religious healing practices, often on grounds unrelated to the criminal charge. See, e.g., Craig
v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959) (evidence insufficient to show that failure to provide care
was proximate cause of child's death); People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515 (1967) (man-
slaughter conviction reversed because defendant had not been advised of her right to counsel and right
to remain silent); Bradley v. State, 79 Fla. 651, 84 So. 677 (1920) (medical neglect not proximate cause
of child's death). The failure to uphold such criminal convictions may reflect judicial sympathy for
those whose religious beliefs result in tragedy. Note, Manslaughter Conviction for Failure to Provide
Medical Aid to Child Because of Religious Belief Reversed, 9 DEPAUL L. REV. 271, 274 (1960); Com-
ment, supra note 4, at 407-08.
135. See, e.g., Indianapolis Star, Jan. 26, 1984, at 1, col. 2 (noting the reluctance of Indiana prosecutors to
file criminal charges in light of the state's religious exemption).
136. See, e.g., State v. Lockhart, 664 P.2d 1059 (Okla. Cr. 1983) (statute provided a defense to a criminal
charge arising from a failure to obtain medical assistance for children).
137. No. 82-CR-205 (Colo. Cir. Ct., Larimer County, Aug. 1982).
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of the first amendment. 3  The exemption provided a defense for the treatment of
children solely by spiritual means when done in accordance with the tenets of a
recognized church by a legitimate practitioner thereof. 139 The court stated:
The real and practical effect of this law is to recognize and give credence to a
particular religion and its practice (i.e., that of healing by prayer alone). The
First Amendment [establishment clause prohibits the] . ..granting of privi-
lege or exemption from the application of its laws to a group for religious
reasons. 140
Despite this ruling, Colorado legislators have yet to modify or repeal the
exemption.
More recently, an Ohio trial court declared that state's religious exemption
unconstitutional. In Ohio v. Miskimens,"4 members of the Christ Assembly sect
were charged with involuntary manslaughter after their 13-month-old son had
died from an infection triggered by pneumonia. Both the prosecutor and the de-
fendants challenged the constitutionality of Ohio's religious exemption. 42 The
court ruled1 43 that the exemption violates the first amendment establishment
clause 1" and the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause1 4 ' and that it is
unconstitutionally vague.146 The court concluded its opinion by emphasizing that
138. Order of Aug. 23, 1982, Colorado v. Lybarger, No. 82-CR-205 (Colo. Cir. Ct., Larimer County).
139. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-114 (1978). For text of the exemption, see supra note 119.
140. Order of Aug. 23, 1982, supra note 138, at 22.
141. No. 83-CR-120 (C.P. Coshocton County, Ohio, Jun. 1984).
142. The exemption reads as follows:
It is not a violation of a duty of care, protection, or support. . . when the parent, guardian,
custodian, or person having custody or control of a child treats the physical or mental illness or
defect of such child by spiritual means through prayer alone, in accordance with the tenets of a
recognized religious body.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Page 1982 & Supp. 1984).
143. Ohio v. Miskimens, No. 83-CR-120 (C.P. Coshocton County, Ohio June 15, 1984).
144. The court concluded that the exemption affords certain religious groups preferential treatment, thus
violating the establishment clause. Id. slip op. at 2-6. The court also found that the exemption results
in excessive government entanglement with religion:
[The exemption] hopelessly involves the state in the determination of questions which should
not be the subject of governmental inquisition . . . such as what is a "recognized religious
body;" by whom must it be "recognized" . . . what are its tenets; did the accused act in ac-
cordance with those tenets; what are "spiritual means;" and what is the effect of combining
some prayer with some treatment or medicine.
Id. at 4-5. The court held that the determination of such issues violated the "excessive entanglement"
prohibition of Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Id. To avoid violating the establish-
ment clause, a statute (1) must have a secular legislative purpose, (2) must have a primary effect which
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) must not foster excessive government entanglement with
religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
145. The court determined that the exemption violates the equal protection clause by denying the children
of faith healing sect members the same protections enjoyed by other children. The court stated that
"the prayer exception creates a group of children who will never be... protected, through no fault or
choice of their own." Id. at 7. The court also held that the law denies equal protection to the parents
not favored by the religious exemption because it creates separate standards of parental conduct based
on religious beliefs. Id. at 6.
146. The court held that the exemption renders the child endangerment statute unconstitutionally vague by
failing to provide fair notice of proscribed conduct. The court employed the three-pronged test for
unconstitutional vagueness delineated in State v. Sammons, 58 Ohio St. 2d 460, 462, 391 N.E.2d 713,
714 (1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1008 (1980): A penal statute is unconstitutionally vague if it (1)
fails to provide fair notice that the contemplated conduct is forbidden (United States v. Harriss, 347
U.S. 612, 617 (1954)), (2) fails to set reasonably clear guidelines for those charged with their adminis-
tration, resulting in arbitrary and unequal enforcement (Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73
(1974)), or (3) proscribes conduct that, by modern standards, is normally innocent (Papachristou v.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 (1972)).
The court concluded that the exemption invites "confusion as to what is or is not required by
parents who prefer the use of faith healing to treat an illness of their child." Miskimens, slip op. at 13.
The court held that the exemption is expressed in terms "so vague that men of common intelligence
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the needless death of a child stands as "the real tragedy of the present lack of firm
definitive standards in this troublesome area of the law . . ,,147
The ambiguous language of Indiana's religious exemption has recently led to
jury convictions of parents whose faith healing practices resulted in the deaths of
their children. 4 ' Although Indiana's exemption permits the use of spiritual treat-
ment in the legitimate practice of religious beliefs, 149 prosecutors have argued that
withholding medical care from children is not a "legitimate" practice of reli-
gion. '5 Accepting this statutory interpretation, two juries have disallowed the
exemption as a defense to criminal charges, thus ignoring the legislative accom-
modation for faith healing practices.' 5 '
Religious exemptions in state child protection laws have troubled those courts
seeking to adequately protect children. Some courts have sought greater child
protection through statutory interpretation, while more recent cases have attacked
the constitutionality of religious exemptions. These decisions reflect the courts'
unwillingness to allow religious exemptions in child protection laws to preclude
state action against parents whose faith healing practices adversely affect their
children. Absent a legislative reevaluation of the rights and duties of parents, the
viability of exemption laws is uncertain.
THE NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Government must actively seek to protect those too young to protect them-
selves. At times this may require the state to protect a child from a well-inten-
tioned parent. Legislators in Ohio and Indiana have recently acted in response to
the controversy surrounding religious exemptions. In Ohio, proposed legislation
would amend the state's exemption in an attempt to conform with constitutional
limitations.' 52 The amended exemption would no longer require that spiritual
healing be done in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized reli-
gion,' 53 thus removing a source of unconstitutional vagueness and government
entanglement. 154 Moreover, the amended exemption would not protect faith heal-
ing practices where such practices result in serious physical harm to a child."'
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Id. at 12 (quoting City of
Columbus v. Becher, 115 Ohio App. 239, 184 N.E.2d 617 (1961)).
147. Miskimens, slip op. at 13.
148. On August 28, 1984, Gary and Margaret Hall were convicted of reckless homicide and child neglect in
the death of their 26-day-old son. State v. Hall, No. S-84-13 (Whitley County Ct., Ind. Aug. 28,
1984). Two weeks later, David and Kathleen Bergmann were convicted on identical charges in a
neighboring county for the death of their nine-month-old daughter. State v. Bergmann, No. SCR-84-
16 (Noble County Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 1984). Both couples were members of the Faith Assembly sect
and had prayed for their ill children instead of seeking medical treatment.
149. See statutes cited supra note 29 and accompanying text.
150. In the Bergmann trial, the prosecutor told the jury that "[r]eligious practice ends where the sacrifice of
innocent children begins." When Faith Lets Children Die, supra note 6, at 32. See also A Child's
Death, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing a similar argument used in the Hall trial).
151. If withholding medical care from children cannot be considered a legitimate practice of religion, one
has to wonder what conduct the exemption protects. The law provides some recognition of faith
healing practices by its mere existence. Perhaps a more accurate interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage would be that withholding medical care from children whose lives are imminently endangered by
medically treatable illnesses is not a legitimate practice of religion. This narrower interpretation still
affords the exemption some meaning. Both Faith Assembly cases have been appealed.
152. H.B. 67, 116th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1985). For the text of Ohio's current religious ex-
emption and a discussion of the court ruling declaring it unconstitutional, see supra notes 141-47 and
accompanying text. For additional sections containing religious exemptions, see OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.03 (Page 1976) and § 2151.421 (Page 1976 & Supp. 1984).
153. H.B. 67, supra note 152.
154. See supra notes 144, 146.
155. If H.B. 67 is passed, Ohio's exemption to its child endangerment law would provide:
It is not a violation of a duty of care, protection, or support under this division when the
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In Indiana, proposed legislation would add the crime of child endangerment to
the state child protection laws.' 56 The bill would make it a crime to withhold
medical care from a child without consulting a licensed physician, where the fail-
ure to provide medical treatment endangers the child's life.' 57 Previous legislation
had removed the religious exemption from Indiana's child abuse reporting law.' 5
Those opposed to legislative reform of child protection laws have claimed that
the removal of religious exemptions would have a detrimental effect on chil-
dren. 159 They question whether a law would deter parents from utilizing spiritual
healing, given the fact that their belief in the practice has withstood even the
deaths of their children. However, members of faith healing sects typically are
taught to obey the law,' 60 making their compliance with the laws probable. In-
deed, eliminating the exemption from state statutes may provide an "easy way
out" for sect members who do not want to admit to a "lack of faith" by resorting
to medical treatment for their children. If parents were legally required to seek
medical treatment for their children, they could overcome the pressure to conform
to the dogma of their faith by blaming their actions on secular law.
Religious exemptions have proven troublesome for those who must interpret
and enforce child protection laws. The mere elimination of these exemptions
would not automatically guarantee all children medical care. It would, however,
establish clear requirements concerning parental obligations and aid in the en-
forcement of child protection laws. Requiring parents to provide medical care
when the health of their children is imperiled will afford states greater latitude in
ordering medical treatment for ill children. Moreover, members of faith healing
sects are more likely to comply with laws that explicitly require medical care for
children. Therefore, eliminating exemptions from child protection laws should at
least temper the use of spiritual treatment in instances where a child is seriously
ill. Criminal prosecutions of parents who refuse to provide medical treatment to
their children would further deter others from following a similar course. If un-
ambiguous child care requirements were set forth by state statutes, perhaps such
prosecutions would be unnecessary.
parent, guardian, custodian, or person having custody or control of a child treats the physical
or mental illness or defect of such child by spiritual means through prayer alone, unless the
failure to treat the illness or defect by medical or surgical care or treatment results in serious
physical harm to the child.
H.B. 67, supra note 152, amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 2919.22(A) (Page 1982 & Supp. 1984)
(emphasis added to indicate new provision).
The bill would also amend the definition of a "neglected child" to include any child "who, in lieu
of medical or surgical care or treatment for a wound, injury, disability, or physical or mental condi-
tion, is under spiritual treatment through prayer, if the failure to provide the medical or surgical care
or treatment results in serious physical harm to the child." H.B. 67, supra note 152, amending OHio
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03 (Page 1976).
156. S.B. 303, 104th Ind. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1985). Two previous legislative attempts to limit
faith healing practices have failed. See H.B. 1041, 103d Ind. Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1984);
H.B. 1147, 104th Ind. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1985).
157. The proposed law would provide the following:
A parent, guardian, or custodian who, acting without the advice of a physician licensed to
practice medicine in Indiana, knowingly or intentionally fails to provide a dependent child with
medical care that is generally provided to similarly situated children, where that failure endan-
gers the child's life, commits child endangerment, a Class D felony.
S.B. 303, supra note 156.
158. IND. CODE § 31-6-11-17 (1981), repealed by P.L. 158-1984, sec. 1 (codified as amended at IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-6-11-17 (West Supp. 1984-1985)).
159. Critics contend that the incarceration of parents will have adverse effects on the surviving children of
sect members. Indianapolis Star, Feb. 3, 1984, at 16, col. 3-4.
160. See, e.g., Flowers, supra note 3, at 159 (characterizing Christian Scientists as law-abiding people);
Indianapolis Star, Feb. 3, 1984, at 16, col. 3-4 (noting that the Faith Assembly instructs its members to
obey secular law).
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In order to effectively deter parents from relying solely on spiritual treatment
for their seriously ill children, state legislatures must respond by eliminating or
amending existing religious exemptions. Under current HHS regulations, states
no longer are required to have religious exemptions in their child protection laws
to qualify for Federal funding under the Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and
Treatment Program. 1 ' By removing these exemptions, a state's legislature can
send a clear message to its citizens concerning what parental inaction will not be
tolerated by the state. Such legislative action would provide parents with better
notice of proscribed conduct and would protect children from serious injury or
death due to treatable illnesses. State courts have long wrestled with the exemp-
tions in an attempt to give them effect while at the same time ensuring that chil-
dren are protected. State legislatures should respond by establishing definitive
standards of parental duty.
Some states have elected to amend their current exemptions instead of com-
pletely eliminating them. In so doing, these states have attempted to protect chil-
dren without unduly interfering with parental and religious freedoms. The
Oklahoma legislature has effectively restricted its religious exemption by requiring
parents to provide medical care where permanent physical damage could result to
their children.16 2 The amendment represents a compromise position which recog-
nizes and allows for spiritual healing unless such practices would result in perma-
nent injury. 163
At the Federal level, the HHS should play a more active role in initiating state
legislative reform. Although the revised HHS regulations were a step in the right
direction, they fall short of ensuring that children will be protected from harm due
to the withholding of medical care. The HEW prompted many states to adopt
religious exemptions pursuant to regulations issued in 1975. The HHS has perpet-
uated these policies by failing to mandate changes in state laws.
In order to counteract the retention of state exemption laws, the HHS should
impose a stricter standard upon states wishing to qualify for funding under Fed-
eral child protection programs. For states electing to retain religious exemptions,
the HHS should require qualifications similar to those adopted in Oklahoma and
proposed in Ohio and Indiana which represent a compromise between religious
freedom and the state's interest in protecting children. The HHS should promul-
gate new regulations to compel states to require that parents provide medical care
where serious physical injury or death could result to a child. By modifying the
regulations in this way, the HHS would force states to reevaluate their laws in-
stead of simply maintaining the status quo. The HHS should take positive action
to instigate such statutory reform.
The problems presented by religious exemptions to state child protection laws
have recently come to the attention of Congress.)" Congress enacted the Child
161. See regulation cited supra note 55.
162. OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 21, § 852 (West Supp. 1984-1985). The exemption precludes a finding that a
child is endangered solely because
the parent or guardian, in good faith, selects and depends upon spiritual means alone through
prayer, in accordance with the tenets and practice of a recognized church or religious denomi-
nation, for the treatment or cure of disease or remedial care of such child; provided, that medi-
cal care shall be provided where permanent physical damage could result to such child; and that
the laws, rules, and regulations relating to communicable diseases and sanitary matters are not
violated.
Id. (emphasis added). The italicized portion was added in 1983.
163. For proposed legislation that would amend other states' exemptions in a similar fashion, see Ohio H.B.
67, supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text; Ind. S.B. 303, supra notes 156-57 and accompanying
text.
164. In 1984, the Senate passed a bill to extend and revise the provisions of the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act of 1974 and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of
1985]
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Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 and subsequent amendments
thereto to help prevent child abuse and neglect.' 6 5 Pursuant to regulations
promulgated by the HEW and HHS to implement the Act, however, most states
adopted religious exemptions which lessen the statutory protections afforded chil-
dren. Some legislators feel that Congress should address this issue directly and
establish clear eligibility requirements for funding under Federal child protection
programs. According to Senator Alan Cranston (D-Calif.):
Congress needs . . . to find a reasonable balance which allows States to deal
with the religious exemption issue in their own fashion while reaffirming the
well-recognized authority of the State, through its judicial system, to protect
the health and lives of the children involved . . . . Congress ought to deter-
mine these issues and not merely relegate them to a regulatory process which
has in the past produced quite contradictory results.' 66
Absent HHS action to shore up current regulations, Congress should directly
confront the religious exemption issue in future legislation. Congress should
amend the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act to include more stringent
standards for Federal funding under the Act. Specifically, Congress should re-
quire all states to recognize that withholding medical care from a child where
death or serious bodily injury is likely to result constitutes child neglect. A find-
ing of neglect should allow the state to intervene on behalf of the child in order to
provide necessary medical treatment. Moreover, such a finding should allow for
criminal proceedings against the parents if such proceedings are deemed to be
warranted. By conditioning state receipt of Federal funds upon the adoption of
such legislation by state legislatures, Congress will better protect children from
medical neglect.
CONCLUSION
Faith healing exemptions in child protection statutes are inherently problem-
atic. The laws in most states, however, still allow parents to withhold medical
care from their children for religious reasons. While courts have struggled to rec-
oncile the competing interests presented by religious exemptions in child protec-
tion laws, state legislatures have largely ignored the problems created by these
provisions. The ambiguous language of exemption laws results in confusion by
creating unascertainable standards of parental conduct. Unfortunately, the vic-
tims of this confusion are the children who die from medically preventable
illnesses.
State laws must provide clear notice to parents of both required and pro-
scribed conduct. State legislatures should act to eliminate or modify their exemp-
tions in order to ensure medical care for all children whose health so requires.
The HHS and Congress should also respond to the problems created by religious
exemptions by requiring states to eliminate or modify their exemptions as an eligi-
bility requirement for grants under Federal child protection programs. A clear
1978. S.1003, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S9306-29 (daily ed. July 26, 1984). The bill
originally included the following provision: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit the right
of a State to determine the health care and treatment a parent may provide his child in the exercise of
the parent's freedom of religion." Id. at S9308. The provision was deleted at the request of its propo-
nents because of the controversy surrounding it. In explaining the removal of the religious provision,
Senator Hatch (R-Utah) stated: "It is a delicate issue ... one that cannot be resolved properly today
and which is therefore being withdrawn from the bill to avoid unnecessary controversy. . . . [I]t is an
issue on which the concerned parties will be continuing to talk in order to reach a satisfactory resolu-
tion." Id. at S9322.
165. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, supra note 36.
166. 130 CONG. REC. S9327 (daily ed. July 26, 1984) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
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pronouncement on this issue will firmly establish the parent's duty to furnish med-
ical care and the child's right to receive such care where necessary.
Wayne F. Malecha*
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